This study concludes that the Air Force should reconsider its adherence to the centralized control portion of its master tenet, centralized control/decentralized execution at the theater level. There are four reasons for this. First, many of the initial motivations for why Airman instituted centralized control are no longer valid. In the past, mass was achieved through numbers of airplanes, it can now achieved through numbers of precision munitions. In the past numerous aircraft were required to destroy a target, now one aircraft can achieve that same level of destruction. Technology provides the ability to subscribe to network centric warfare where before, hierarchical chains of command were required. Second, the enemy is adaptive. The enemy will continue to disperse, mass quickly, attack, and rapidly disperse again. This limits engagement of the enemy to fleeting moments. Control of airpower below theater level best adapts to this new time constraint. Third, I present six studies demonstrating centralized control has never taken place at the theater level. Never having achieved centralized control at theater level does not automatically mean the Air Force should give up on that goal. However, it does imply another method of airpower employment may be feasible. Exacerbating the centralized control of airpower debate is the Air Force's own confusion on the topic. The Air Force fully defined centralized control only recently. The animosity and confusion taking place between services while getting centralized control defined has created unnecessary tension amongst sister services.